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I.

Introduction: The Legal Education Discussion in Japan

Japan is about to change its system of legal education. His‐
torically the Japanese legal and legal education systems have been
influenced by their German counterparts. In April 2004 Japan will
introduce law schools.3 Many in Japan are asking whether there are
elements of the American legal education system that might profita‐
1

© James R. Maxeiner 2002.
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2002 at the First Symposium on Law and Jurisprudence, Kansai University
Osaka—Georg-August Universität Göttingen, New Challenges for Law and
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bly be introduced here. I would like to address that question from
the perspective not only of the American legal education system, but
also through comparisons to the German system. In this way, the
choices available to Japan are clearer. In considering both the Ger‐
man and the American systems of legal education as possible mod‐
els, it is important to realized that there is satisfaction with neither
of them and that both have been subject to considerable and con‐
tinuing criticism.4
Law faculties in Japan are asking whether and how they
should remake themselves to become law schools. One basic issue
has been framed in terms of whether such programs should be pro‐
fessional or general.5 One Japanese scholar put it pointedly: “[a] ma‐
jor issue of the proposed reform is whether Japan should adopt an
American model law school, i.e., professional education at the gradu‐
ate level, while essentially doing away with the traditional Japanese
method of teaching law at university.”6 American law schools are
seen as having as their fundamental goal “to provide the training and
4

In Germany, in particular, the last thirty years have seen many reform proposals. See generally Bericht des Ausschusses der Justizministerkonferenz zur Koordinierung der Juristenausbildung für die Konferenz der Justizministerinnen
und Justizminister vom 11. bis 13.6.2001 in Trier, Juristisches Schulung 2001,
933,
also
available
at
http://www.justiz.nrw.de/jm/landesjustizpruefungsamt/aktuelles/pdf/bericht.pdf;
Filippo Ranieri, Reform der Juristenausbildung ohne Ende?, Juristenzeitung
1998, 831. For an extensive review of one reform that was tested, see Juristenausbildung—erneut überdacht: Erfahrungen aus der einstufigen Juristenausbildung als Grundlage für eine weiterhin anstehende Reform (Heinz Giehring et
al., eds., 1990). For the United States, see, e.g. Legal Education and Professional
Development—An Educational Continuum, (Report of the Task Force on Law
Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, 1992, the “McCrate” Report). I
am limiting my discussion to the existing systems. For a comparison that is still
current, see Jürgen R. Ostertag, Legal Education in Germany and the United
States—A Structural Comparison, 26 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
301 (1993).
5
Yukio Yanagida, A New Paradigm for Japanese Legal Training and Education—In Light of the Legal Education at Harvard Law School, 1 Asian-Pacific
Law and Policy Journal, text at note 54 (2000), also available at
http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/1/01.html.
6
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education required for becoming an effective legal practitioner, i.e.,
the institutions provide a ‘professional legal education.’”7
It is not my intention to tell Japanese jurists to adopt the
American or the German model.8 Indeed, Japan could hardly adopt
either. Whatever Japan does do will be distinctively Japanese. What I
would like to do is to discuss the professional character of American
law schools in the context of a comparison with German legal in‐
struction. My focus is on differences in the hope that these compari‐
sons will help clarify thinking about the choices available to Japan.9
That comparative perspective leads me to suggest that before one
considers using the American legal education system as model of
professional education, one should ask the preliminary question:
What should the legal system itself look like?
II.

Fundamental Differences

An American comparativist, John Henry Merryman, percep‐
tively noted that examination of legal education in society is “a win‐
dow on its legal system.” It tells us much about “what law is, what
lawyers do, how the system operates or how it should operate.”10
Many—perhaps most—differences between the German and Ameri‐
can legal education systems are explained by three fundamental dif‐
ferences:
 The German legal system is expected to provide an objec‐
tively correct legal answer; the American legal system is ex‐
pected to provide procedures to resolve disputes about what
subjective rights are.
 The German legal education system trains judges (and inci‐
dentally lawyers) to find legally correct answers; the Ameri‐

7

Yanagida, supra note 5.
Cf. Mark Levin, Legal Education for the Next Generation: Ideas from America,
1 Asian-Pacific Law and Policy Journal (2000), also available at
http://www.hawaii.edu/aplpj/1/03.html (taking great care to avoid preaching to
Japanese colleagues).
9
Unfortunately, I am not in a position to make comparisons directly to the Japanese system.
10
Legal Education There and Here: A Comparison, 27 Stanford Law Review
859 (1974), reprinted with a prefatory note in Merryman, The Loneliness of the
Comparative Lawyer at 53 (1999). Citations here are to the reprint.
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can legal education system trains advocates (and incidentally
judges) to make arguments in favor of subjective rights.
 The German legal education system was created by the State
to train its judges and is funded by the State; the American
legal education system was created by private legal profes‐
sionals and is funded principally by the students.
These fundamental differences lead to differing legal education sys‐
tems:
Education of legal professionals in Germany
In Germany, the system of legal education was established to
train civil servants for the State.11 All persons who wish to become
legal professionals, whether as lawyers or as judges or otherwise,
are trained as judges. The image of the judge colors the ideal of the
legal professional. And it is the judge’s mastery of the techniques of
applying law to facts (Relationstechnik) that defines the judge.12 The
role of the German judge is to determine facts, to apply the law to
those facts, and to state those conclusions in a formal judgment. “A
German judgment is supposed to appear as an act of an impartial as
well as impersonal public authority furnishing the official and objec‐
tive interpretation rather than being based on the personal opinions
of the deciding justices.”13 It is to deliver a legally correct answer. It

11

See Reinhard Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in
Introduction to German Law 28 (W. Ebke & Matthew Finkin eds. 1996); Ranieri, supra note 4, at 832 (“Das preußische Referendariatsmodell … prägt heute
noch das deutsche Justiz- und Rechtssystem.“)
12
Accord, Alfred Rinken, Einführung in das jursitische Studium 135 (1977).
13
Zimmermann, supra note 11, at 21. The importance of this difference in legal
thinking for legal education was noted nearly a century ago by the Austrian jurist, Josef Redlich, in a study he was commissioned to make of American legal
education: “To the German and Frenchman of our time, therefore, the law appears always in popular thought as the abstract rule, as the general principle, to
which all individual relationships of the citizens are a priori and for its own sake
subordinated. To the Englishman and the American, on the other hand, the law
appears rather as the single case of law, as the single subjective suit, conducted
by the regular judge, and depending only upon his ‘finding of the law.’” The
Common Law and the Case Method in American University Law Schools, A
Report to the Carnegie Foundation, Bulletin No. 8, at 36 (1914).
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is the judge’s duty to implement—and not to make—political deci‐
sions that have been made by others.14
In Germany, law students learn the substance of the law at
the university.15 Later, in the practical period of German legal educa‐
tion that follows university instruction, the Referendarzeit or intern‐
ship period, they learn the Relationstechnik of relating facts to law
and of crafting judgments. Judges as classroom teachers didactically
teach classes that lay out the fundamentals of this technique, while
individual judges, at least in theory, tutor the aspiring legal profes‐
sionals, the Referendare or interns, as apprentice judges. The interns
are paid by the State. The interns learn how to take the substance of
the law they learned at the university, how to conduct legal proceed‐
ings to determine facts, and how to justify in legal judgments their
correct determinations of how law applies to particular cases.16 In
short, they learn to do what a judge has to do.17
14

See Walther Richter, In welcher Weise empfielht es sich, die Ausbildung der
Juristen zu reformieren?, Gutachten F zum 48. Deutschen Juristentag 23 (1970).
See also James R. Maxeiner, U.S. “methods awareness” (Methodenbewußtsein)
for German jurists, in Festschrift für Wolfgang Fikentscher (Bernhard Großfeld
et al., eds. 1998), at 114; James R. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German
and American Antitrust Law: A Comparative Study (1986); James Maxeiner,
Rechtspolitik und Methoden im deutschen und amerikanischen Kartellrecht:
eine vergleichende Betrachtung (1986).
15
Compare Merryman, supra note 10, at 67 (“The truth is known by the professor and is communicated to the students.”).
16
Professor Fikentscher has explained it this way: in the university students
learn the “non-litigious opinion style” and in the internship period the “litigious
opinion style”. (Stil des unstreitigen Gutachtens and Stil des streitigen Gutachtens respectively). Interns learn to handle cases with varying sets of facts and
subject to different claims, objections, replications, etc. They put the many different relevant non-litigious opinions into one litigious opinion from which they
then extract a judgment: “the judge renders a decision,’ a judgment, and this
decision is the litigious opinion turned upside down, namely, beginning with the
outcome, continuing with the legal rules that support the claims, objections, rejoinders,, and duplicas, and ending with the subsumption. This is presented
claim by claim, objection by objection, rejoinder by rejoinder, duplica by duplica, the whole judgment being arranged by claims. By contrast, as has been
said, the non-litigious opinion starts with an open question: Could the plaintiff
have this claim?, continues with the subsumption, and ends with a ‘therefore.’”
17
German law requires that to become lawyers, candidates must establish their
suitability to be judges (Befähigung zum Richteramt). The German Lawyers’
Association challenges this requirement as an anachronism. See Bericht, supra

6
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Education of legal professionals in the United States
In the United States, the system of university legal education
began as a private substitute for an existing informal private system
of apprenticeship training conducted by practicing lawyers. That ap‐
prenticeship system continued alongside the university system for
the entire nineteenth century and remained at least a theoretical
possibility for much of the twentieth.18 All persons who wish to be‐
come legal professionals, whether as lawyers or as judges or other‐
wise, are required to be trained as advocates, that is, as private law‐
yers.
In the United States the German view that the role of the
judge is to apply law to facts is rejected.19 Americans legal profes‐
sionals see the legal system instrumentally, that is, as a system for
resolving concrete disputes. It is the role of the judge in the Ameri‐
can system to preside over a clash of competing interests and to clar‐
ify what is the law that governs the dispute’s resolution. The role of
the advocate to find a way to the client’s desired resolution through
shaping of the law, the facts, and the judgment of the dispute.20 In
recent years, the lawyer has come to be seen as “social engineer;”
note 4, at 29-30. The significance of dispensing with this requirement should not
be understated. As Professor Raiser recently observed, the German judge is
seen to stand above the parties, to be neutral, to not work for money, but selflessly for truth and justice. The attorney, on the other hand, has a more complicated: to work in the client’s interests and for justice. Thomas Raiser, Reform
der Juristenausbildung—Förderung von Beratunds- und Gestaltungsaufgaben
als Ziel der Juristenausbildung, Zeitschrift für Rechtspolitik 2001, 418, 422.
18
See generally Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from
the 1850s to the 1980s (1983); Alfred Zantzinger Reed, Training for the Public
Profession of the Law: Historical Development and Principal Contemporary
Problems of Legal Education in the United States, Carnegie Foundation Bulletin
No. 15 (1921).
19
See, e.g., Edward Levi, Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1 (1949) (“It is important that the mechanism of legal reasoning should not be concealed by its
pretense. The pretense is that the law is a system of known rules applied by a
judge; the pretense has long been under attack.”); Lawrence M. Friedman,
American Law: An Introduction 85 (1984) (American legal realists “sneered at
the idea that the way to decide cases was by logical deduction from preexisting
cases and rules”).
20
See Maxeiner, U.S. “methods awareness, ” supra note 14.
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that view is said to predominate among law professors.21 Judges
revel in the role of making political decisions.22
The American case method of legal instruction trains stu‐
dents to identify a precise point in controversy and to argue for re‐
solving that controversy favorably. It teaches them first to find the
legal rule relevant to the instant controversy by distilling it out of a
mass of precedents, and then second, to argue for a favorable resolu‐
tion of that point.23 There is no need for the student to make a legal
decision let alone to place such a decision in any kind of system out‐
side of the context of the particular case. Legal argument is the end
in itself.24 A German student exposed to examinations in both sys‐
21

Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Columbia Law Review 723, 773 (1988) (American law school professors have a
“deep-rooted belief that lawyers are social engineers”); Michael P. Schutt,
Oliver Wendell Holmes and the Decline of the American Lawyer: Social Engineering, Religion, and the Search for Professional Identity, 30 Rutgers Law
Journal 143, 176-77 (1998) (“A century after Holmes, however, in the midst of
the celebrated “crisis” in the legal profession, the position of the American lawyer as social engineer extraordinaire was taken for granted to a greater extent
than ever by the legal elite—the bench and the academy.”)
22
See, e.g., Charles E. Wyzanski, Whereas—A Judge’s Premises 6 (1965). See
generally Mary Ann Glendon, The Ways and Tastes of Magistrates in A Nation
Under Lawyers 111-73 (1994).
23
Nearly a century ago Redlich perceptively captured the essence of this
method: “Under the old method law is taught to the hearer dogmatically as a
compendium of logically connected principles and norms, imparted ready made
as a unified body of established rules. Under [the case method] these rules are
derived, step-by-step, by the students themselves by a purely analytic process
which forbids a priori acceptance of any doctrine or system either by the teacher
or by the hearer. In the former method all law seems firmly established and is
only to be grasped, understood and memorized by the pupils as it is systematically laid before them. In the latter, on the other hand, everything is regarded as
in a state of flux; on principle, so to speak, everything is again to be brought into
question. Redlich, supra note 13, at 13.
24
Richard Stith, Can Practice Do Without Theory? Differing Answers in Western Legal Education, 80 Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 426, 433
(1994). (“An excellent student is one who can argue either side of a case with
equal facility, who is trained to be a ‘hired gun’.”) This (as well as other aspects
of the litigation system) helps explain two other features of American legal life.
(1) The party with the better lawyer should win. (2) Counseling clients is not so
much about whether particular action is within or outside law, but about who
might argue that the proposed action is improper and whether they would have a
colorable claim.
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tems picks up on the obvious differences: in America, students are
taught to identify and make arguments (“issue spotting”); in Ger‐
many, they learn to decide cases.25
American legal methods are taught principally in the first
year of law school, which is the pride‐and‐joy of American law
schools. The courses are almost always the same: contracts, torts,
property, civil procedure and criminal law. Yet it is not their sub‐
stance that matters: it is that students are taught to “think like law‐
yers.”26 Nearly a century ago an Austrian observer, Josef Redlich, at‐
tributed the victory of the case law method of instruction in America
over older competing apprenticeship and lecture methods to the
dominance of the common law system of finding the law in the appli‐
cation of each particular case. Professor Redlich found the principles
underlying the case method to be “practically demanded by the very
nature of the common law.”27
So well has the American law school done its job of teaching
students to be advocates that there is no longer any requirement of
professional practical experience for admission to the bar. The suc‐
cess of the university legal education at eliminating competing forms
of training should not be taken, however, to imply success in itself
25

See, e.g., Nihls Behling, “St. Louis Diary: A German Student’s Tale about
Academic Life in the United States,” on the Internet on December 20, 2001 at
http://www.jura.uni-sb.de/gast/slu-diary/, who writes: “The style of the questions in the essay section was pretty much comparable to the stile of German
essay exam questions, with one big difference though. While in Germany students are required to put themselves into the position of judges and consequently
solve the problems of the case, here students have to put themselves in the position of attorneys. Therefore, a typical question would be: Imagine you are A’s
counsel. How will you advise your client in this situation? What defenses will
the other side possibly raise? Accordingly, the answer does not call for a lengthy
development of the legal questions, but rather requires to precisely spot the issues of a case, and to state the applicable rule together with a short reasoning.”
When I mentioned this to one student recently, he responded that he was taught
not to find answers, but to argue that there are none.
26
This was the predominant view already a century ago. See Redlich, supra note
13, at 24-25. Not all law students believe that they are being taught to think like
lawyers. See Alan Watson, Legal Education Reform: Modest Suggestions, 51
Journal of Legal Education 91 (2001). Watson inclines to agree with the skeptical students. In any case, when this is repeated in second and third year
courses—as it frequently is—it is incredibly boring.
27
Redlich, supra note 13, at 37.
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providing all practical training. Although there is no such legal re‐
quirement, the reality is that many, perhaps most, young lawyers
informally apprentice to law firms, courts and work under the su‐
pervision of established legal professionals before they have respon‐
sibility as legal professionals.28
Professional legal education in American law schools and in
Germany
In both Germany and America legal education is professional
education in at least one sense: in both countries most students who
enter law studies do so intending to become legal professionals. The
course of studies offered to them anticipates that. The majority of
students do eventually become legal professionals. What this means
for the Japanese discussion is that it would be wrong to consider one
foreign model more “professional” than another. Introducing fea‐
tures from one model or the other should not be regarded as “more
or less” professional.
The oft‐observed difference between legal education as
“graduate” education in America as opposed to “undergraduate”
education in Germany is off‐the‐mark.29 It fails to take into account
differences in the respective secondary and higher education sys‐
tems. The German gymnasium has a mission similar to that of the
American college. The average Gymnasium graduate is likely to be
about as well prepared for his or her professional legal education as
is the average American college graduate.30 Consequently, I do not
28

Another development that may have helped law school education win out was
the contemporaneous demise of the complicated forms of pleading in litigation.
Pleading had some similarities to German-style subsumption.
29
That Americans frequently make this distinction may be because this distinction was important in the history of American legal education. High school
graduates in the USA were not ready for legal studies and so law schools sought
students with some college education and finally were able to insist on undergraduate degrees. In support of this view, see Ostertag, supra note 4, at 315-20.
For an argument contrary to this view, see John Henry Merryman, “Note on
Legal Education,” supra note 10, at 51-52.
30
See Joachim Hruschka, Gedanken zur amerikanischen Juristenausbildung,
Juristenzeitung 1999, 455. The best American students may be better prepared
than most of their German counterparts. As with so many comparisons between
Germany and the U.S., performance levels in the U.S. are less standard and vary
more than in Germany. Indeed, one could legitimately argue that German law
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believe characterization as graduate or undergraduate is helpful.
Much more important—and where I believe the focus should be—is
what are the knowledge and skills sought to be imparted and where
those skills are taught.
IV.

Some aspects of professional education in American law
schools

I now turn to some more specific aspects of professional
education in American law schools. These are aspects of American
law schools that foreign observers often note or should note. I can‐
not well say to what extent each of these aspects is necessarily in‐
herent in the American system of legal education.
The professional focus of American law schools
American law schools have a professional focus, but that does
not necessarily mean that their focus is either on practice or on the
practical. The similarities of these three words—both in concept and
sound—make it easy even for native English‐speakers to slip from
one concept to the other. By practice, I mean the profession of the
private lawyer; by practical, I mean the day‐to‐day tasks that a legal
professional must do.
American law schools certainly place more emphasis on the
private practice of law than do German university law faculties. Simi‐
larly, compared to German university instruction in the law, Ameri‐
can legal education does indeed have more of a focus on the practi
cal. The apparent practical focus of American legal education disap‐
pears, however, when one compares it to the practical training of the
Referendarzeit in Germany. The practical training of the Referen
darzeit is training in how one does a judge’s job. It may also be train‐
faculties, more than American law schools, take a “graduate” approach to education. In Germany Lehr- und Lernfreiheit prevail. German university students are
no longer children, but adults: they are Studenten not Schüler. It is up to them to
direct their education. Accomplished students have an opportunity to work
closely with an academic mentor on a substantial piece of original scholarship,
i.e., a doctoral dissertation. In contrast, the American school treats students more
as children. Attendance is taken; students want to be “spoon-fed” basic material;
and, opportunities for substantial scholarship comparable to the German doctorate are rare.

American Law Schools as Model for Japanese Legal Education?

11

ing during the second year spent outside the court system in how
lawyers do their jobs. Education in American law school, in contrast,
is not usually training in how a lawyer does a lawyer’s job.31
The professional goals of American law schools
Professor Merryman asserts that American legal education
has “much grander objectives” than do its Civil Law counterparts and
that its mission is “a much richer, more demanding, and more realis‐
tic one.”32 Stated is a most positive of ways, it is to train students to
be problem‐solving lawyers and law‐making judges. While the mis‐
sion may, in some respects be grander, American legal education
really has much less to teach: namely, skills in law finding and in ar‐
gumentation. German legal education has to educate students in the
system of German law, which has to be understood in order to find
the objectively correct solution it requires.33 Lest anyone doubt this
conclusion, one need only compare the requirements for admission
to the bar in both countries. Germany has not one, but two state ex‐
ams. Each is considerably longer and more difficult than any single
American bar exam. Many foreigners with little or no American legal
training sit for and pass an American bar exam.
American law students as customers

31

To the extent it does provide such training, it is only training to argue legal
points in appellate or motion practice. One practicing lawyer recently said to me
that he learned nothing useful in law school. When I asked what he meant, he
said that all that he had discussed were litigated cases. These were of only limited utility in his practice as a counseling lawyer.
32
“[American legal education] is better because it has grander objectives: because it draws on the full time and energies of teacher and student; because it is
concerned with human problems and their solution; because it engages students
directly in the study and active solution within the legal order; because it displays a higher opinion of the student and demands more of him; and because its
conception of the work of the professional lawyer—and accordingly of the mission of legal education to prepare persons for the profession—is a much richer,
more demanding, and more realistic one.” Merryman, supra note 10, at 73.
33
Thus us poor Americans who choose to study German law have more of a
challenge than do Germans seeking to learn American law. There is some analogy to learning the respective languages: English, with its absence of cases and
genders, it easier to learn than German!
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Just as they once had to pay for apprenticeship training,
American law students pay substantial fees for their legal education.
Tuition at some law schools is higher than $25,000 a year. Students
are the customers and, as is well known in marketing, the customer
is always right. Students who pay substantial tuition are not inter‐
ested in extending their period of study any longer than absolutely
necessary. They know that there is no formal practical training after
law school. If they are to become successful lawyers, such training as
they get will come in law school. They thus largely seek, and legal
education reformers largely propose,34 that increased resources be
allocated to more practical skills education (e.g., clinical legal educa‐
tion). Increasingly one sees such instruction. The student/customers
in most American law schools evaluate classroom performance of
their professors. After each course, the students fill out evaluation
forms about the performance of the professor. To a greater or lesser
extent depending upon the law school, the pleasure of the students
has significant effects on professional careers.
Professional education as privately funded education
American legal education is principally funded by private
sources, generally by the students themselves. This is true even of
state‐sponsored institutions. In relying principally on private funds,
the law schools do not differ from much of American higher educa‐
tion. Private funding both creates a competition among law schools
and means that law schools have control over their own existences.
Law schools that can offer their students the best faculty and the
best facilities are the most sought after by student/customers. Since
law schools need take only so many students as are necessary to
raise needed funds, they can choose to limit the total number of stu‐
dents. According to Professor Merryman, American law schools,
freed of the need to be “democratic” and of a politically imposed re‐
quirement to accept all qualified applicants, can impose a “meritoc‐
racy”, where the better law schools select only the better students.
The result is, he observes, that the academic quality of student bod‐
ies tends to be stratified according to the national reputation of law

34

See, e.g., the most noted of more recent proposals for reform, the so-called
“McCrate Report”, supra note 4.
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schools.35 He acknowledges that this meritocracy can “compound
social injustice.”36
Thanks to high demand for legal education and control over
enrollment, the better off American law schools have established
conditions for study that impress foreign visitors. Compared to legal
education in foreign universities, student faculty ratios are favorable,
faculty course loads are light, and facilities approach the palatial.
Richer schools have more comfortable facilities, more professors,
more courses and more of just about everything. Rankings of law
schools—once almost never spoke of—have now become largely
accepted measures of schools.37 Money is, in fact, a significant com‐
ponent in the most widely‐used ranking of law schools.38 But this
competition has probably benefited even less well‐off schools. It has
enabled them to charge higher tuition to their students to keep up
with the better off schools or, if state‐supported, to get additional
funds from the state legislature. It has encouraged them to find spe‐
cial niches in which to respond to demands not otherwise met by
wealthier schools.
35

Merryman, supra note 10, at 56.
Merryman, supra note 10, at 57. Professor Fujikura has discussed how importing American ideas without American money could lead to problems in the
Japanese system that is more dependent on state funding. See Fujikura, supra
note 6, at 945-46.
37
The earliest substantial discussion of these rankings of which I am aware of
was by a German-American law professor and appeared in Germany. See Walter
O. Weyrauth, Hierarchie der Ausbildungsstellen, Rechtsstudium und Recht in
den Vereinigten Staaten (1976) Now, such a comparison is a successful publishing venture. See U.S. News & World Report, Best Graduate Schools 2002 Edition (Washington: 2001). The book has spawned an internet site where one can
find the up-to-date rankings. See www.usnews.com. Although American law
schools officially disparage this ranking, those that do well do not refuse to participate and seek to improve their standing, sometimes illicitly. See Dale Whitman, Doing the Right Thing, Newsletter [of the Association of American Law
Schools] 1 (April 2002) (President of law school group describes such illicit
steps). See generally Mitchell Berger, Why the U.S. News and World Report
Law School Rankings are both Useful and Important, 51 Journal of Legal Education 487 (2001). The concept of law school ranking has even been adopted in
Germany. See Axel Westerwell, Die besten Universitäten für Juristen: Deutschland—Österrich—Schweiz (1997).
38
Described as “faculty resources” it accounts for 15% of the U.S. News &
World Report ranking. See U.S. News & World Report, supra note 36, at 47.
36
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Resources certainly do matter. Based on personal experi‐
ences as a student in American law schools, in a German law faculty
and in a German Referendar program, as well as a high school and
college student, I am convinced that the single most important factor
in school learning is class size. When class size exceeds thirty, a stu‐
dent with only a modicum of self‐direction, is likely to learn as much
from reading as from attending a class, regardless of the class’s for‐
mat. Smaller classes, preferably ten to twenty students, promote
learning through interaction among students and teacher.39
Professional education rather than academic education
American law schools typically focus on concerns of interest
for legal practice rather than on more general concerns of law. The
education they provide is said to be “professional” rather than aca‐
demic education.40 Already in 1914 Redlich identified as a weakness
of the case law method of instruction that the “students never obtain
a general picture of the law as a whole, not even a picture which in‐
cludes only its main features.”41 Alan Watson, a Scottish comparativ‐
ist who has taught in America many years, much more recently,
came to the same conclusion. He believes that case law teaching
means that students “are not given the framework of the law.”42 “The
absence of theoretical underpinnings is a fatal flaw in the casebook
approach.”43 According to Professor Watson, “Legal education in the
United States is geared to making legal plumbers, not legal scholars,
not reflective, philosophically and socially attuned practitioners.”44
Other U.S. born critics agree that law is an “art” or a “craft”.45 One
39

The case law method of instruction was an attempt to bring that kind of interactive learning to large classes.
40
Stith, supra note 24, at 427.
41
Redlich, supra note 13, at 41.
42
Watson, Legal Education Reform, supra note 26, at 93.
43
Alan Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer in the United States, in Alan Watson, Law
Out of Context 140, 143 (2000) 140, 143.
44
Id. at 148-49. See also Alan Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors,
A Case Study in Conflict of Laws 96, 118 note 29 (1992) (“To an extent unparalleled elsewhere, students are not exposed to systematic treatment of law, with
clear-cut concepts, institutions, and rules, but are presented with individual
cases, outside of a historical, doctrinal, legal context but against a background of
social interests.”)
45
E.g., Stith, supra note 24 , at 427.
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German student in America observed that American law schools
provide “Training statt Bildung.”46 Recent years have seen some
movement in this area. While the focus remains largely professional,
more opportunities exist than before for more academic instruction.
This is usually confined to upper division elective courses. Some law
schools even require students to choose at least one so‐called “per‐
spective” course from a group of courses such as jurisprudence, legal
history, or comparative and international law.
The professional trainer in American law schools
The role of the American law professor is that of trainer.
Cynically put, it is to train “hired guns” or “Hessians”.47 More posi‐
tively put, professors are expected to take as much or more interest
in the development of their pupils as in the development of the law.
Pupils are required to attend class and professors are to monitor
that attendance. Professors take an interest in and to an extent re‐
sponsibility for their pupils’ passing the bar exam. In Germany, law is
a science. Legal science is the development of an objective legal or‐
der. It is as much the role of the German law professor to help de‐
velop the ideal legal order as it is to educate the professionals who
operate it.48 In any case, the sheer numbers of students would limit
active faculty involvement with students. Where one does see close
relationships between faculty and students is in the scientific study
of law, i.e., in faculty research and student dissertations.
46

Der Rechtskulturschock: Anpassungsschwierigkeiten deutscher Studenten in
amerikanischen Law Schools, Juristische Schulung 1984, 92, 93. Just how effectively they do that is itself a subject of dispute. The point is similarly debated in
Germany. See, e.g., the dialogue Jurastudium heute – und morgen! between
Bernhard Großfeld and Klaus Peter Berger in Betriebs Berater 1998, 1756 and
2596, where Professor Großfeld challenges case-oriented education and Professor Berger supports it as practice-oriented.
47
Stith, supra note 24 , at 433 (“An excellent student is one who can argue either side of a case with equal facility, who is trained to be a ‘hired gun’.”)
48
See, e.g., Horst Ehmann, Die Aufgabe der Zivilrechtslehrer, in Die Aufgabe
der Juristenfakultäten, Festgabe für Otto Theisen, 11, at 34 (1996) (“Die Aufgabe der Juristenfakultäten ist die Bewahrung, Verbesserung und Fortentwicklung
des Rechts sowie die Ausbildung künftiger Juristen nach dem idealen Bilde unserer Zeit in der Hoffnung, daß die Schüler dieser Fakultäten in ihrem Berufsleben ein wenig von den idealen Vorstellungen verwirklichen können, von den wir
nur träumen.”)
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Scholarship in American law schools
In the early years of American law schools, scholarship was
relatively unimportant. This resulted in part from the mission of
American law schools and in part from the nature of the Common
Law as a system of judge‐made law. Already Redlich in 1914 warned
of a “certain disadvantage which the case system possesses for the
scientific activity of law”.49 Since the judges in the Common Law
world are the last word on the law, systematizing efforts comparable
to the German Civil Law tradition of codes and commentaries are
much more difficult. This kind of systematic development of the law
through treatise writing has come to be denigrated as “doctrinal”
and driven from the law schools as something inappropriate to true
scholarship.50 One noted critic observed that “[d]octrinal scholarship
has been in relative decline for many years, having been abandoned
by many law professors, especially young ones and especially at elite
law schools.”51 In its place has arisen a new form of scholarship that
calls for examining legal rules from social science perspectives; an‐
other critic calls that “amateur social science.”52
Selection of faculty in American law schools
Selection of American law faculty reflects their role as train‐
ers; it is quite different, not only from their German counterparts,
but also from other faculty in American universities generally. While
one might think that a professional school would prefer faculty from
practice, this is not the case. Indeed, American law school faculty are
often criticized for having an antipathy to practice.53 American law
49

Redlich, supra note 13, at 50.
Stith, supra note 24 , at 434.
51
Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 84 (1995).
52
Stith, supra note 24 , at 434. For a book length treatment of competing views
of legal scholarship in the United States, see Arthur Austin, The Empire Strikes
Back: Outsiders and the Struggle over Legal Education (1998). For an explanation for foreign law students in the United States of the great variety of what
counts as scholarship there, see Matthew A. Edwards, Teaching Foreign LL.M.
Students about U.S. Legal Scholarship, 51 Journal of Legal Education 520
(2001).
53
According to Professor Glendon, “Legal scholars, of all intellectual persuasions, have never been more disdainful than they are at present concerning legal
50
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school faculty who teach practice‐oriented, practical skills courses
are often relegated to second‐tier status.
American law professors are generally selected because they
did well in elite law schools. They are “very smart,”54 but are not
necessarily wise. They are chosen, an American comparativist notes,
for “mere brilliance.”55 They possess, a critic observes, “not knowl‐
edge but intelligence.”56 Their selection has a standard path: good
school marks in one of a small number of elite law schools, followed
by a year or two working as an assistant to a judge, the higher up in
the judicial hierarchy the better (“clerkship”), followed by at most
one or two years in some kind of legal practice.57
American law professors are normally not selected because
of scholarship, either of the doctrinal or the social science kind. The
career path just mentioned scarcely allows for it. Clerking for a
judge—the most common background these days—does not train
one in the systematic study of the law, but in decision of specific
points in issue. There is no counterpart to the German Dr. jur., let
alone to a Habilitationsschrift. Although in most departments of
American universities, a doctoral degree requiring closely super‐
vised academic work with a distinguished mentor is the rule, it is not
in the law schools.58
traditions, nor more detached from the practice of law.” Supra note 22, at 178.
See generally Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 Michigan Law Review 34 (1992); Harry T.
Edwards, Another ‘Postscript’ to ‘The Growing Disjunction between Legal Education and the Legal Profession,’ 69 Washington Law Review 561 (1994).
54
Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 43, at 162.
55
James Gordley, Mere Brilliance: The Recruitment of Law Professors in the
United States,” 41 American Journal of Comparative Law 367 (1993).
56
Stith, supra note 24, at 428 (“and, often, wit.”).
57
See Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 42, at 161-62. Supreme Court
clerks are the most sought after. Cf. Yukio Yanagida, supra note 5. See also Joel
Seligman, The High Citadel, The Influence of Harvard Law School 123 (1978).
58
See Posner, supra note 51, at 101: “The essence of most graduate education is
not the courses and the exams, but the preparation for a career in scholarship
that is afforded by the experience of writing a dissertation. Few law professors,
even when they are practitioners of the new scholarship, have that experience.”
See also Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 43, at 162: “What [the new
law professor] does not have is a rigorous training akin to a Ph. D. in law under
a distinguished mentor. She has no publications, and she has nothing in the
course of publication. She has no scholarly record. Whether she is likely to be-
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Law review work should not be confused with scholarship.59
V.

Conclusion: One Preliminary Question to Ask

In contemplating changes in a legal education system, one
should ask, what do we want the legal system to do? Part of that
question is to ask how things would be different if we changed them?
For example, what would the German legal system look like if the
Referendar system were eliminated? Would the Relationstechnik dis‐
appear or be relegated to use only by judges? How would this affect
how German lawyers think and act? As Japan embarks on the road of
legal education reform, the one piece of advice I would offer to Japa‐
nese jurists is, ask first where you want that road to go.

come a scholar in the sense understood in the arts and sciences is not even usually under active consideration by the faculty that hires her.” The usual requirement is only a J.D., or Juris Doctor, which while styled a doctorate, is not in any
conventional sense. All 175 U.S. law schools combined bestow only a handful
of true doctorates in law, the S.J.D., each year—less than twenty, typically.
Stith, supra note 24, at 428. See also Robert J. Borthwick and Jordan R. Schau,
Note: Gatekeepers Of The Profession: An Empirical Profile of the Nation's Law
Professors, 25 University of Michigan Journal of Legal Reference 191, 212
(1991) (noting the sharp decline in the last generation of new law professors
with advanced degrees in law). One newly named professor, formerly a Supreme Clerk and Harvard Law Review President, was quoted in the law school’s
alumni magazine as saying: “Part of the frustration in a busy law practice is that
there’s often little time to think deeply and creatively about issues in the law. I
can’t wait to do that as a professor.”
59
According to Professor Watson, “The law review is the most bizarre feature
of American law schools …” Watson, The Aspiring Lawyer, supra note 43, at
155. The acme of American legal “scholarship” is membership on the Harvard
Law Review, yet selection is based not even on academic grades, but on a competition that is not determined by scholarship. See 2001-2002 Harvard Law Review Membership Selection Policies, consulted on December 20, 2001 at
http://www.harvardlawreview.org/Policies.html (“The competition consists of
two parts. The subcite portion of the competition, worth 40% of the competition
score, requires students to perform a technical and substantive edit of an excerpt
from an unpublished article. The case comment portion of the competition,
worth 60% of the competition score, requires students to describe and analyze
[within one week using provided materials] a recent U.S. Supreme Court or
Court of Appeals decision.”)

